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Background: Resilience engineering is a paradigm for safety management that focuses on coping with
complexity to achieve success, even considering several conflicting goals. Modern sociotechnical systems
have to be resilient to comply with the variability of everyday activities, the tight-coupled and under-
specified nature of work, and the nonlinear interactions among agents. At organizational level, resilience
can be described as a combination of four cornerstones: monitoring, responding, learning, and
anticipating.
Methods: Starting from these four categories, this article aims at defining a semiquantitative analytic
framework to measure organizational resilience in complex sociotechnical systems, combining the
resilience analysis grid and the analytic hierarchy process.
Results: This article presents an approach for defining resilience abilities of an organization, creating a
structured domain-dependent framework to define a resilience profile at different levels of abstraction,
and identifying weaknesses and strengths of the system and potential actions to increase system’s
adaptive capacity. An illustrative example in an anesthesia department clarifies the outcomes of the
approach.
Conclusion: The outcome of the resilience analysis grid, i.e., a weighed set of probing questions, can be
used in different domains, as a support tool in a wider Safety-II oriented managerial action to bring safety
management into the core business of the organization.
 2017 Occupational Safety and Health Research Institute, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Several changes are occurring in the business and socioeconomic
environment, contributing to increase the complexity of work
practices in sociotechnical systems. A sociotechnical system is a
purposeful structure consisting of interrelated and interdependent
social and technical elements influencing one another, directly or
indirectly, to maintain their activity and the existence of the system
itself to purse its goal [1,2]. Sociotechnical systems are made up of
people who produce products or services using some technology,
affecting the operation and the appropriateness of the technology as
well as theactionsof thepeopleoperating it. Their interactionspartly
comprise linear causeeeffect relationships and partly nonlinear,
complex, even unpredictable ones. In a sociotechnical system, two
sub-systems are tightly interrelated: the social and the technical
systems. The social subsystem comprises of the people working
within the organization at different levels (employees, managers,and Aerospace Engineering, Sapie
Patriarca).
afety and Health Research Institute
c-nd/4.0/).contractors, etc.) and the relationships among them (behaviors, ac-
tivities, communication, etc.) [3,4], even in terms of work attitudes,
skill levels, and occupational roles. The technical subsystem consists
of the artefacts used to convert inputs to outputs, including mate-
rials, machines, territory, and techniques used to accomplish the
tasks of theorganization itself [5], throughworkprocesses, roles, and
procedures strictly related towith the social subsystem. Examples of
sociotechnical systems are the air traffic management system, a
production plant, maritime operations, and healthcare practices.
For these systems, following the technological advances in the last
decades, procedures and organizational activities have become
increasingly more sophisticated, leading to increase system’s
complexity. Individuals have to thus cope with a challenging envi-
ronment, whose complexity inherently emerges in everyday activ-
ities, as well as in design, implementation, and maintenance.
Traditional approaches in safety management focus on adverse
outcomes (accidents, incidents) trying to reduce their numbersnza University of Rome, Via Eudossiana 18, 00184, Rome, Italy.
, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-
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labeled Newtonian reasoning [6], traditional safety management
aims at reducing the variability of everyday work through stricter
regulations and procedures to constrain work activities. This
approach relies on the causality credo, i.e., the possibility to find a
specific causeeeffect link for any event, decomposing the system
in its constituent parts, and generally thinking about humans as a
source of failures, as summarized by the concept of Safety-I [7].
Nevertheless, Safety-I assumptions are effective only if system’s
complexity is limited. In complex operating scenarios, such as
nowadays sociotechnical systems, there are many strong in-
teractions among human, technical, organizational, procedural,
and regulative aspects that lead to lose an effective linear under-
standing of the whole system functioning. The acknowledgment of
the inevitable complex nature of sociotechnical systems pushed
safety management research toward focusing on a different
perspective, i.e., aiming at understanding everyday activities. In
everyday activities, work-as-done is different from work-as-imag-
ined, and this difference requires humans’ adaptation to cope with
variable operating scenarios and safely ensure system’s produc-
tivity safely. This adaptation is embodied in the concept of
resilience.
Resiliencedat largedcan be defined as a system property that
confers the ability to remain intact and functional despite the
presence of threats. Thus, resilience engineering is the ability to
engineer systems that are resistant to disturbances. As proved by
successful applications in several sociotechnical domains, mainly
humans’ resilience acquires a crucial role to maintain system’s
effectiveness and positive capabilities. Cognitive tasks (e.g., decision-
making, inference, reasoning, learning, etc.) become central for
maintaining safe and efficient operations.
There are several examples detailing the relevance of resilience
in sociotechnical systems, for example, adaptive capacity of air
traffic controllers and pilots has been modeled to understand how
variability is managed to prevent runway incursions during normal
runway operations [8]. Similarly, in the rail traffic domain, the
crucial role of traffic controllers in coping with increasingly com-
plex automation and ensuring system resilience has been
acknowledged [9]. Resilience becomes necessary to deal with the
synchronic and diachronic couplings of system functioning, as
proved by a resilience engineering perspective used to analyze the
Fukushima disaster [10]. Note that resilience is not by itself the
solution for improving system performance, but by adopting a
systemic approach it will be possible to understand where resil-
ience is necessary and where it is not, as theoretically discussed in
the healthcare domain [11].
For this purpose, one of the principal efforts in the discipline of
resilience engineering consists of anchoring the concept of resil-
ience to some clearly describable features to develop operational
means for its assessment [12,13].
Resilience engineering suggests four abilities to be considered
for achieving resilient performance, i.e., responding, monitoring,
learning, and anticipating. The resilience analysis grid (RAG) aims
at measuring how resiliently an organization performs in everyday
work based on assessing how the organization responds, monitors,
learns and anticipates in everyday activities. Therefore, the RAG is
developed as a questionnaire to produce a resilience profile of the
organization, in terms of the four abilities of resilience, the so-
called four cornerstones [14].
With the purpose of measuring organizational resilience in a
complex system following a systematic and structured approach,
this article aims at answering the following research question:
- How should a method for measuring organizational resilience
in a sociotechnical system be designed to consider thefunctional properties of the system and be used as a decision
support tool to address criticalities, in a safety management
perspective?
Starting from the traditional formulation of RAG, this article
proposes an innovative analytic hierarchy process (AHP) frame-
work to represent the effects of each resilience ability (responding,
monitoring, learning, and anticipating) to organizational resilience,
by user-friendly indicators that can be analyzed at different levels
of abstraction. This framework allows dealing with the complexity
of the system itself and identifies weakness and strengths of work
activities, which remains a puzzling activity for managing system’s
resilience.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2
describes materials and methods of this article, presenting the
relevance of the four cornerstones of resilience and detailing their
meaning in different work domains. Section 3 discusses the tradi-
tional RAG structure and its enhanced approach based on AHP,
including an illustrative case study in an anesthesia department.
The Section 4 offers critical reflections on the outcomes of the
study, clarifying the potential for further research. Lastly, the Sec-
tion 5 summarizes the outcomes of the study.
2. Materials and methods
Resilience is defined as the system’s ability to retain or recover
a rapidly stable condition, enabling pursuing its normal func-
tioning during, and following, any expected or unexpected dis-
ruptions. Resilience reflects the ability of trading-off between
safety and production objectives, managing conflicting goals’
pressures [15e17].
2.1. Resilience in four cornerstones
In the field of resilience engineering, several research efforts
aimed at linking resilience to some clearly describable features. One
of the most diffused approaches led to decomposing resilience into
four cornerstones, acknowledging that a resilient system needs to
be conveniently balanced among them [14]. Following this view,
the system must be able to respond to any type of events
(addressing the actual), to monitor underway evolutions (address-
ing the critical), to anticipate future threats and opportunities
(addressing the potential), and to learn from past failures and
successes (addressing the factual). The validity of these four cor-
nerstones has beenwidely recognized for representing successfully
how people feel comfortable with unexpected and unforeseen
events in everyday work [18] and to promote proactive strategies
for managing daily operations [19]. The same cornerstones have
been used to define a dedicated framework, which considers legal,
institutional, organizational, and procurement aspects of societal
resilience [20]. Even in the air traffic management context, the
SCALES framework [21] and the ADAPTER questionnaire [22], both
starting from the four cornerstones, have been used to retrieve
resilience indicators and patterns to identify criticalities and the
focus of more detailed approaches.
2.2. Responding: dealing with the actual
Responding to external and internal disturbances or, more in
general, to any input or signal is a crucial need for every system. A
system has to be able to distinguish between what is urgent and
what is important and provide effective and on-time responses to
maintain productivity and ensure safety. This distinction is
necessary to ensure that the real-time competences that needed to
cope with unanticipated or extreme events at the sharp-end are
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sponding responses to all the possible events [23]. Responding is
linked to sharp-end decision-making: managing potential vari-
ability of patient status and defining the cognitive threshold over
which requiring additional resources is generally a difficult task
[24]. Several examples of prompt responding to system disruption
can be retrieved in the health-care literature, especially in the
emergency departments, which demands for strong responding
capabilities due to the inevitable variability of everyday practices
[25e27].
As a summary, the analysis of this cornerstone should aim at
providing material for understanding what capacities are required
to properly respond to everyday situations.
2.3. Monitoring: dealing with the critical
The ability of responding is linked to the capability of under-
standing actual threats timely and precisely. An effective
responding has thus to be linked to an effective monitoring of
system’s status and of its operational environment, i.e., acquiring
signals related to both positive and negative situations.
In traditional safety management [7], monitoring consists of
adopting indicators such as the number of adverse events: mainly
accidents [28] and also other less-consequence events, such as in-
cidents and near misses [29], are used generally as feedback signals
of system safety. On the contrary, for resilience engineering, it has
been claimed the need to gather data from intermediate status,
monitoring how the system actually performs during its normal
functioning [30]. This target is generally acquired by leading in-
dicators, i.e., precursors to events that are not happened yet, and/or
lagging indicators, i.e., observations of events already happened.
Note that a lagging indicator related to the short-term staffing
change (e.g., numbers of workers suffering from fatigue-related
injuries) might be considered a leading indicator for the need of
systemic changes [31].
The analysis of this cornerstone should aim at defining relevant
indicators to gain knowledge of current working conditions.
2.4. Anticipating: dealing with the potential
In a traditional sense, the ability of anticipating is related to
forecasting future events based on historic data [7]. Even if these
representations offer an overall understanding of safety levels [32],
they might fail at anticipating hidden and newdnever happened
beforedthreats or even at determining the need for buffers and
reserves to face unexpected pressures.
What makes anticipating different from monitoring is generally
the different time scale of observations and the related point of
view. The ability of anticipating generally extends the focus of
monitoring’s leading indicators to cope with long-term changes,
threats, opportunities, and environmental potential status. At
different organizational levels, monitoring and anticipating might
become complementary. For sharp-end operators, coping with
near-term issues is an operational everyday activity (monitoring);
at the blunt-end, more attention is paid generally to strategic
decision-making, relying on long-term analysis (anticipating). The
distinction is not a dichotomy because strategic decisions affect and
are affected by operational behaviors and vice versa [33]. Typical
anticipating features are related to understand if, and how, future
events like threats and opportunities are modeled (e.g., qualita-
tively, quantitatively, etc.), understanding which efforts in terms of
expertise and funding are employed for this purpose [34].
The analysis of the ability to anticipate should look at detecting
upcoming threats and opportunities timely and efficiently and in-
crease system’s preparedness.2.5. Learning: dealing with the factual
Traditional safety management bases learning on adverse
events, i.e., accidents, incidents, near misses. Normally, in safe
systems, this assumption clashes with the principles of effective
learning: the presence of reasonable opportunities to learn (a
reasonable number of situations); the similarity of situations to
avoid having only event-specific conclusions (the events should be
comparable in some sense); the opportunity to verify whether the
lessons have been learned [35]. Therefore, it becomes necessary to
integrate the learning from accidents, or evenmore extreme events
such as emergencies and catastrophes, with learning from minor-
consequence events or even from normal functioning, namely
everyday activities [14]. It is from lessons learned that an individ-
ual, or even an organization, increases his/her ability to manage
threats, adopting or adapting (refer to Weick’s sensemaking theory
[36,37]) his knowledge creatively to manage unexpected situations
[38,39]. At the same time, an effective learning should lead to
choose worthy synthetic indicators and give means to anticipate
potential future threats and opportunities.2.6. RAG in literature
In accordance with the need to understand and monitor resil-
ience [40], intended as a combination of the four cornerstones,
Hollnagel originally developed a questionnaire-based tool in 2011,
the RAG [41]. Hollnagel himself suggests that the RAG is not an off-
the-shelf tool, but it is rather intended as a basis to develop ques-
tions, which must be specific for the system under analysis.
One of the first applications of RAG is discussed in the domain of
rail traffic management, aimed at identifying a set of potential
vectors for improvement, with particular reference to the need of
integrating trade-offs and making easier to assess and control nu-
ances of the abstract cornerstones [42].
For the purpose of integrated planning of maintenance and
operations in an offshore oil and gas company, 16 critical functions
have been assessed by a list of RAG-based questions. The study
points out the benefits of adopting RAG after a system change to
understand the effects of the change on the organization at least
once a year [43]. A case study for the air traffic management system
details the application of RAG to measure organizational resilience,
in collaboration with several domain experts. The study confirms
the benefits of repeating the RAG several times during a long period
of time [44]. In the health-care domain, the RAG has been used to
derive probes for each cornerstone, creating an interview script
iteratively revised based on responses to pilot interviews as well as
feedback by human factors and resilience engineering experts [45].
In addition, a recent study based on RAG in Polish enterprises of
different sizes and activities shows how the implementation of
occupational safety and health management system does not
actually affect safety and resilience levels [46]. For the purpose of
measuring team resilience, the RAG has been even updated by two
additional dimensions, i.e., leadership and cooperation, suggesting
its use for contextualizing actual events and having it filled after
specific incidents [22]. This recent interest in the RAG formulation
motivates the need to explore its building process to increase its
potential benefits for sociotechnical systems.2.7. RAG’s building process
The RAG consists of four phases [41]:
- RAG 1. Define and describe system’s structure, boundaries, time
horizon, people, and resources involved.
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application of the analysis, contextualizing the set of questions to
ask.
- RAG 2. Select relevant questions for corresponding relevant items
of the studied system.
This phase requires large efforts to define a proper set of ques-
tions which would be reliable enough to describe the system, not
being so large to require unmanageable processing times. Even if
there are several abstract commonalities across different high-risk
domains of what the cornerstones mean [47,48], it is hardly
possible to define general questions valid for each domain. Since
resilience is strongly related to the system’s purpose for which it
has to be assessed, the four cornerstones have to be detailed in a
domain-specific context. This phase is usually a recursive activity to
formulate the more appropriate questions, involving several sub-
jectematter experts (SMEs).
- RAG 3. Rate the questions for each cornerstone.
Once the questions are finalized, it is necessary to identify a pool
of people working in the system who could answer them. In this
sense, techniques to collect data are unconstrained; it is thus
possible to develop informal phone or face-to face interviews [46],
open questions in focus groups [42], narratives [45] or surveys. The
surveys represent the most frequent technique [22,43,44] as they
allow faster processing times, even if they do not allow dynamic
interactions in data collection: for the interviewee to recall expe-
rience and for the interviewer to fill eventual gaps and in-
consistencies in the judgments.
- RAG 4. Combining the ratings.
In this phase, data are usually presented in a star plot where
each axis corresponds to the variables used to rate each corner-
stone. It might be possible to obtain an additional four spoke star
chart combining the individual cornerstones’ charts, to gain a
description of the organizational resilience.
Note that the star plot is not a measure of resilience per se, but it
represents in a compact way how the abilities are rated in a specific
time moment: it represents a snapshot of organizational resilience
under specific conditions. Therefore, it might be performed multi-
ple times to follow and monitor performance developments. The
RAG can be used firstly to determine where the system is; then to
spot where the system should be; finally to understand how the
system may reach a target status.
Nevertheless, the traditional outcomes of the RAG fail to
represent the relative importance of each category and questions
and their impact on the organizational resilience (the corner of a
star plot do not offer any insights on these aspects). Although these
open issues have been widely discussed according to a theoretical
perspective acknowledging the need to understand the domain-
specific balance among the abilities [41], there is no operational
solution in literature. This research aims to fill this gap, through an
innovative analytic structured formulation for the RAG based on
the AHP.
2.8. The AHP for the RAG
The AHP, introduced by Saaty [49], is a multicriteria decision-
making technique, which aims at reducing complex decisions to a
series of pairwise comparisons, in a user-friendly formulation. In
terms of the RAG, the AHP might be used to combine objectively
subjective judgments and determine the relative weight of eachvariable, i.e., defining the effects on organizational resilience of each
category and question [50]. To adopt the AHP, it is assumed that data
collection will take advantage of a structured survey. In terms of the
four traditional phases of the RAG, the AHP aims at structure of the
second phase of the RAG, i.e., RAG 2, through a systematic frame-
work to determine and weigh the final set of questions. The AHP’s
outcomes constitute an input data for the traditional third phase,
RAG 3 and obviously inherently affect RAG 4.
The AHP steps, contextualized for the RAG application, can be
described as follows:
- AHP 1. Define the problem and determine the kind of knowledge
sought.
The purpose of this phase consists of determining the factors
that influence organizational resilience. This step thus corresponds
to the preliminary activities performed for the second phase of
RAG, i.e., RAG 2.
- AHP 2. Structure the decision hierarchy.
This step allows defining the hierarchy of the problem, from the
top with the goal of the process, through intermediate levels
(criteria onwhich subsequent elements depend) to the lowest level
(which usually is the set of alternatives but here represents the
different safety events). In term of RAG, this phase consists of
defining a hierarchy of resilience abilities: the overall organiza-
tional resilience lies at the top level, while the four cornerstones lie
at the intermediate levels, and at the lowest levels, there are the so-
called categories and, eventually, sub-categories. The lowest level
shall include the final questions. The need to develop questions in a
hierarchical structure affects the traditional second phase of RAG,
implying a systematic reorganization of the RAG questions. Even if
this task may generate additional efforts, it actually offers an
inherent support in developing the questions themselves and
guiding the analysts to follow a structured approach by the support
of a multilevel reasoning [51]. Note that this step has to take into
account the experts’ judgments and consists generally of an itera-
tive procedure (see Fig. 1 details of a real scenario, as discussed in
the case study).
- AHP 3. Elaborate a set of pairwise comparison matrices.
Each element in an upper level compares to the elements in the
level immediately below. Pairwise comparisons express a relative
judgment between two elements in a 9-degree scale of importance
(1 ¼ equal, 3 ¼moderate, 5 ¼ strong, 7 ¼ very strong, 9 ¼ extreme)
and the reciprocal value is assigned to the inverse comparison. In
the elements of the pairwise comparison matrix A, aij represent the
importance of i-th criterion over j-th one. Since the elements satisfy
the constraint aij  aji ¼ 1 and aii ¼ 1, only n (n  1)/2 comparisons
are necessary. At this step, the consistency index IC has to be
evaluated based on the eigenvalues l of the matrix A [49].
If IC < 0.1, the matrix is consistent, and the judgments can be
considered not contradictory. For the purpose of applying the RAG,
the comparison at the intermediate level, i.e., the four cornerstones,
might be too abstract for evaluation and thus their weights might
be considered equals. Lower levels of abstractions might be instead
evaluated following traditional AHP theory.
- AHP 4. Use the priorities coming from the comparisons to
weigh the priorities in the level immediately below.
This weighing process has to be repeated for each element, also
including the weight of the upper category to gain an overall
Fig. 1. Process flow for phase 2 of RAG based on the AHP.
AHP, analytic hierarchy process; RAG, resilience analysis grid.
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principle has to be applied to determine the importance of every
element for organizational resilience, which represents the main
goal in the AHP language. Therefore, starting from the lowest level,
the local weight of every element has to be multiplied for local
weight of the related parent element, transforming them in global
weights.
In terms of the RAG, once the AHP is applied and the elements’
weights are identifieddboth local and globaldat each level of the
hierarchy, it is possible to continue with the traditional survey, as
discussed in the third phase of RAG, i.e., RAG 3. The AHP’s structure
will inherently modify and enhance the data management in the
fourth phase of RAG, allowing detailed comparisons among ques-
tions and their effects on the system, as clarified by the illustrative
example in Section 3.
3. Results
This section details an illustrative application in the health-care
domain of the innovative RAG analytic framework based on the
AHP. Mainly due to the instrumental, procedural, and organiza-
tional continuous evolution, new challenges constantly affected
health-care system. The human interaction with these factors
became steadily more complex, requiring resilience as a means to
manage the variability of everyday performance [52,53]. Under-
standing how resilient is a health-care organization might repre-
sent a valuable contribution to determine how effectively the
organization manages the complexity of everyday work, defining
weaknesses and strengths.
3.1. RAG phase 1
This illustrative application focuses on an anesthesia depart-
ment of a hospital located in Central Europe. The aim of the study
consists of assessing the organizational resilience of neuro-
anesthetists working in the same department, by a RAG-based
weighted survey. The target of the study consists of assessing
how the individuals working in the department contribute to
organizational resilience in terms of the four cornerstones, appro-
priately contextualized for the need of a neuroanesthesia domain.
3.2. RAG phase 2
The AHP guides the development of this phase. Starting from a
literature review on resilience engineering, specifically focused on
previous applications of the RAG, an initial set of categories (Level 2
of hierarchy) and questions (Level 3) has been created. In the hi-
erarchy, formally the four cornerstones occupy Level 1, while the
overall organizational resilience represents Level 0.
A focus group (one staff and two resident neuroanesthetists and
two researchers working in the field of resilience engineering)
tuned this initial framework to adapt it properly for the needs of the
specific neuroanesthesia department.
After this phase, a preliminary version of the survey has been
tested with four physicians: two staff and two resident neuro-
anesthetists. This test led to modify the framework slightly,
reducing the size of questions and rephrasing some of them to
make them clearer and avoid misunderstanding.
Fig. 1 summarizes the process and Table 1 details the final list of
categories (Level 2 of the hierarchy). Note that the staff doctors
answering the preliminary survey were not the same involved in
the focus group. Theoretically, it would have been necessary to
develop pairwise comparisons at each level of the framework.
However, for operational reasons, the AHP weighing process hasbeen restricted to the Level 2 of the framework. The comparisons
at Level 1 would have been too abstract to obtain meaningful and
unambiguous responses; and the comparison at Level 3 would
have been of limited added value, considering the reduced size, i.e.,
two or three questions for each Level 2 category (also considering
the extra resources necessary in this additional weighing process).
Consequently, the weights of Level 1 and Level 2 have been thus
assigned automatically as equally important, respectively 0,25 for
each cornerstone, and 0,50 or 0,33 for each questions, in case the
category included respectively two or three questions.Afterward, based on the final structure of Level 2 (see Table 1),
seven neuroanesthetists (the ones involved in the focus group and
in the preliminary test) help defining the weights for the cate-
gories, individually filling an online survey. This allows pairwise
comparison among the categories, based on a 9-point scale (A and
B equally important, A slightly more important than B, A mildly
more important than B, A much more important than B, A abso-
lutely more important than B, and vice versa). It has been chosen
to ask for individual answers, rather than collective ones (e.g., in a
focus group) to avoid that individual attitude to team working, or
organizational role might have influenced judgments. Then, a
grouping strategy for the judgments has been applied relying on
geometric mean [54]. These surveys were not anonymous, in order
to ease the verification of judgments’ coherence following an
iterative approach to verify IC < 0.1 for each judgment, as described
Saf Health Work 2018;9:265e276270in [54]. The outcome of this phase represented the final set of
weighed questions, as summarized in Fig. 2 and more specifically
in Fig. 3.Table 1
List of RAG categories for each cornerstone (AHP Level 2)
Responding Monitoring Anticipating Learning
R1. International guidelines M1. List of questions for preoperative
examination
A1. Improvement projects L1. Discussion of clinical cases
R2. Internal protocols M2. Preoperative specialist support A2. Research activities L2. The register of clinical cases
R3. Resources availability in expected situations M3. Intraoperative risk analysis A3. Introduction of new equipment L3. Event analysis
R4. Resources availability in
unexpected situations
M4. Identification of intraoperative
complications
A4. Participation in updating plans and
procedures
L4. Practical activities
R5. Experience M5. Instrumental support A5. Planning of training activities L5. Theoretical teaching
R6. Discretionary power M6. Postoperative check A6. Surgeries scheduling L6. Mentoring
R7. Teamwork d A7. Communication L7. Learning check
R8. Roles division d d L8. Experiences in other institutes
AHP, analytic hierarchy process; RAG, resilience analysis grid.3.3. RAG phase 3
At this step, it has been necessary to rate each element at Level 3
of the hierarchy, i.e., the probing questions, by a specific survey. The
survey was anonymous, gathering few profile data on the inter-
viewee (sex, age, role in the hospital, and years of experience). The
questionnaire included a description of the meaning of each cate-
gory and a 5-point Likert scale, linguistically adapted for each
question, as shown in Fig. 3. The survey has been submitted to 12
neuroanesthetists (six staff and six resident) of different ages and
experience, working in the same department.
3.4. RAG phase 4
This phase summarizes the answers gathered from the 12
neuroanesthetists involved in the third phase of RAG, suggesting an
interpretation of the results. As discussed in literature, one of the
main advantages of using the RAG consists of monitoring the
relative evolution of organizational resilience (e.g.,) repeating the
assessment over time [45]. However, for this illustrative applica-
tion, a single preliminary assessment will be discussed. Neverthe-
less, other potential ways to interpret RAG data are presented,
taking advantage of the AHP structure. At Level 1 of the hierarchy, it
is possible to represent how the organization performs respectively
for each cornerstone (see Fig. 4). As a preliminary observation, one
can note how the system appears to be much more able to respond
and monitor, rather than to anticipate and learn. This abstract
conclusion, obtained by combining all the judgments at each level,
can be discussed further in terms of the categories for each
cornerstone, as detailed in Fig. 5. This analysis allows detailed ob-
servations, detecting which categories mainly contribute to overall
resilience. For example, in terms of learning, anesthetists feel quite
comfortable about event analysis, i.e., reactive and proactive in-
vestigations undertaken following an accident or a risky event to
detect contributing factors. About the ability of responding, expe-
rience has a crucial role, as expected. In addition, the study shows
that resources availability cannot be considered the most critical
aspect, regardless if considering expected or unexpected events.
About Monitoring, even if real-time observations of complica-
tions during intraoperative phase seem to be effective, the analysis
shows some drawbacks about the preoperative specialist support.
This conclusion considers those frequent scenarios where theanesthetist needs support to further investigate the patient’s clinical
conditions, but he/she does not receive a proper support, mainly
due to delays and problems for interacting with other departments.In terms of Anticipating, the interviewees show a strong confi-
dence in communication with surgeons and nurses. Communica-
tion’s high score shows how the verbal interactions among
different practitioners allows anticipating future threats and miti-
gating emerging risks in patient safety, especially in case of shift
rotation over the same intervention.
Furthermore, additional observations can be drawn from the
results of the RAG, through a cluster analysis. Thinking of resilience
as a multilevel property of a system, the purpose of this cluster
analysis consists of identifying how the individuals contribute to
organizational resilience, assuming that the organization provides
the context for individuals or group of them to make local and
global system properties emerge [55]. On this path, even if the
sample is limited, it allows interesting observations about how
resident and staff neuroanesthetists differently contribute to the
overall organizational resilience. This cluster analysis is intended to
tailor the definition of criticalities and the development of potential
mitigating actions to manage system’s resilience.
More specifically, at Level 1, one can observe that resident
neuroanesthetists offer a lower contribution to organizational
resilience (see Fig. 6), intuitively related to their experience in the
field. This abstract observation can be broken down taking advan-
tage of the AHP hierarchy to gain more detailed and helpful
insights.
Fig. 7 offers a two-dimensional representation to give an over-
view of the categories where the staff neuroanesthetists’ contri-
bution to overall resilience prevails on the residents’ one (the area
under the dashed line), and vice versa (the area above the dashed
line). This analysis shows that in some specific categories the
resident neuroanesthetists are more resilient than the staff ones,
i.e., L.4 (practical teaching activities); R.1 (international guidelines);
M.3 (intraoperative risk analysis), M.6 (postoperative check); A.2
(research activities), A.6 (surgeries scheduling).
A focus group with three doctors (the same involved in the focus
group during phase two of RAG, see Section 3.2) allowed drawing
interesting conclusions. For example, about Research
activities (A.2), the focus group confirms that resident neuro-
anesthetists generally play a major sharp-end role in trials and
experimental projects. These activities force them to keep abreast
of anesthesiology scientific evolution, increasing their anticipating
skills, i.e., their resilience. This factor has been perceived as positive
for the benefit of the organization, indicating the need at a
Fig. 2. AHP structure and weights for each cornerstone, category, and question.
AHP, analytic hierarchy process; RAG, resilience analysis grid.
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thetists in research activities.
On the contrary, about the aspect Participation in updating
plans and procedures (A.4), staff neuroanesthetists prevail on
resident ones, since the latter are not usually involved in the
planning processes. Staff doctors, whose expert opinion is
generally predominant, feel more comfortable to manage pro-
cedures and plans in which they have been directly involved. Theresults of the RAG motivate a managerial action to encourage the
involvement of people with fresh eyes, i.e., resident doctors, in
medium and long-term planning. The proposal of these two
managerial actions aim at fostering multiskilled anesthetists with
interchangeable roles and distributed workloads, in line with
1950s seminal observations in mining systems [1], and as recently
confirmed in the health-care domain (see [56] for an example in
operating room and [57] for information technology
Fig. 3. Details of nomenclature and example of questions.
AHP, analytic hierarchy process.
Saf Health Work 2018;9:265e276272management). At Level 3, further observations can be drawn,
based on scores of specific probing questions. For example, local
improvement actions might consist of increasing the number of
teaching activities with mannequins (L.4.1) and stressing the
relevance of using a complete list of questions during the pre-
operative visit (M.1.1). For this latter aspect, the results of the RAG
motivated a detailed investigation of everyday work, which
confirmed that the preoperative visit is frequently underrated for
apparently healthy patients, generating potential complications
during the intraoperative phase for underestimated risk factors.
At management level, the development of a dedicated trainingaction to underline the need of an accurate and detailed preop-
erative visit, regardless of the patients’ conditions, has been
strongly encouraged.
4. Discussion
Measuring resilience is a challenging task, mainly because it re-
quires an empirical, context-dependent measurement tool. On this
path, since resilience refers to something that a system does, rather
than something it has, the RAG in combinationwith the AHP defines
a resilience profile that may offer insights to understand when and
Fig. 4. The RAG score for the four cornerstones.
RAG, resilience analysis grid.
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capable of sustaining the required operations.
When assessing an inherent property of a system, e.g. its resil-
ience, it is important to avoid making important what is measured,
rather than measuring what is important, defining relevant proxy
measures as for the proposed approach. Therefore, it is useful to
remember that the RAG profile, even in combination with the AHP,
does not offer an absolute rating of system’s abilities but a relative
assessment support tool to compare different RAG profiles. The
RAG can be used to assess how the resilience profile of an organi-
zation changes over time, using it repeatedly with the same groupFig. 5. The RAG score for each category at Level 2 of the hierarchy.
RAG, resilience analysis grid.of respondents and/or to assess resilience profiles for different
groups of respondents (as discussed in the case study).
As emerged in the case study, there are no predetermined set of
indicators, but they have to be specific to the context and the risks
that exist in a specific scenario. For this purpose, the involvement of
SMEs working within the organization (with a job related to the
target of the assessment) acquires a crucial role, as understandable
through the lessons learned from the case study presented in the
article. It is important to gain a strong consensus among SMEs in
the process of defining the final set of questions, since this will
clearly affect the definition of the resilience profile and the iden-
tification of the mitigating actions. Sharp-end operators have to be
involved among the SMEs in the development of the RAG, in order
to get a meaningful and reliable set of questions which can define a
resilience profile that is able to describe how the system cope with
the complexity of everyday activities. While developing the RAG in
combinationwith the AHP, the analyst has to limit the efforts of the
respondents, trying to define a reasonable number of questions. As
emerged from the case study presented in this article, the most
time-consuming phase is the weighing process of each category
through specific pairwise comparison matrices. For this purpose,
we developed an online user-friendly survey taking advantage of
Google Survey, which allowed respondents to answer questions
directly from their computer, tablet, or smartphones, limiting the
perceived efforts in the task. The format of the tool was extremely
appreciated by the respondents, who were willing to contribute
even in the iterative procedure to maintain the coherence of the
pairwise comparison judgments, as explained in Section 3.2.
Similarly, another survey to rate each probing question has been
developed in Google Survey, as needed for the third phase of RAG.
Fig. 6. The RAG score for each category at Level 1 of the hierarchy and comparison
between the resilience profiles of staff and resident neuroanesthetists.
RAG, resilience analysis grid.
Saf Health Work 2018;9:265e276274The framework and the structure of the online surveys can be
adopted in different departments or organizations, but requiring
the contextualization of the domain-dependent categories and
variables.
Even if the AHP does not limit the number of hierarchical levels,
lessons learned from the case studies suggest that a three-level
structure adequately represent the need of a sociotechnical
assessment. More specifically, Level 2 is a reasonable level of
abstraction to weight the factors, with the possibility to avoid too
much abstract weighting process (at Level 1, for the four corner-
stones), or too detailed ones (at Level 3, for the questions). Also note
that the AHP could be used to rank factors and exclude from the
analysis those categories that receive substantially lower weights
than others, under the assumption that their effect on organiza-
tional resilience is limited. This assumption will eventually requireFig. 7. The RAG score for each category at Level 2 of the hierarchy and comparison betwee
RAG, resilience analysis grid.a renormalization of the other weights, generating a potential
reduction of the number of questions to be answered.
In line with the traditional RAG approach, multiple represen-
tations may be helpful to describe the relative status of the
system or the effects of a systemic change in the resilience profile.
In this context, a limitation of the illustrative case study presented
in the article is the limited size of the sample, which has to be
increased in future research. Furthermore, a larger sample would
have allowedmultiple cluster analyses to compare different groups
of respondents and gain multiperspective insights. Similarly,
although the illustrative case study presents a single assessment of
the resilience profile, capable of generating valuable insights, a
systemic analysis would largely benefit of multiple assessments
over time to assess the evolution of the resilience profile of the
organization (as a whole or for different clusters).
In terms of future research, for potential adaptation of the
framework presented in this article to different domains, it is
helpful to recall that the analyst might even not limit the RAG to the
four cornerstones, extending or modifying the categories, if other
abilities are specific to a work domain.
Future research might even explore the possibility to extend the
analysis by a network structure, based on the analytic network
process, allowing assessment of interaction and dependence of
higher level elements in a hierarchy on lower elements. However,
in this case, the analytic structure will be more complicated,
requiring more time-consuming pairwise comparisons. In terms of
methodological formulation, other approaches to gather data could
be evaluated as well, i.e., interviewing people to get open answer
and ensure the interviewees completely understand the questions.
Even in this case, more resources will be requested for gathering
data, in addition to the need of experienced interviewers.n the resilience profiles of staff and resident neuroanesthetists.
R. Patriarca et al / An Analytic Framework to Assess Organizational Resilience 275Lastly, future research may focus on the development of a fuzzy
AHP, to deal with the problem arising when making static and
deterministic quantitative assessment. Owing to the linguistic
values and variables necessary for the application of the RAG, the
decision of taking the fuzziness into account might provide
potentially less biased and more realistic assessments.
5. Conclusions
Within the scope of resilience engineering for safety manage-
ment, this article suggests an approach to measure resilience by
means of the RAG, a questionnaire-based tool based on the four
cornerstones of resilience. Since resilience is a property of the
system and is strictly dependent on the features of the system itself,
the theory of resilience engineering does not prescribe a standard
meaning of the four cornerstones or even a certain desired balance
or proportion among them. Adopting the AHP, this article develops
a structured approach to determine an in-depth meaning of resil-
ience abilities, creating a hierarchy based on different level of ab-
stractions. The RAG’s survey data, systematically weighed following
the AHP, represent a resilience profile that can be used to assess the
system status and to addressdif necessarydpriorities for inter-
vention (both for safety and performance enhancement), as
confirmed by the outcomes of the illustrative case study presented
in this article. It is important to observe that due to its inherent
questionnaire-based nature, the RAG relies on truthful answers
and, consequently, on an interviewee who wants to exaggerate in
one sense or the other his/her work conditions, which can seriously
affect its value. For this purpose, even if increasing the number of
participants may reduce considerably the risk of facing this bias,
there is the need to develop the RAG as part of a wider Safety-II
oriented managerial action with focus on sharp-end activities. In
this local analysis, the outcome of RAG could even motivate
detailedwork-as-done research, usingmethods to analyze systemic
interactions and functional properties, e.g., through the Functional
Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) [58] and/or the Systems-
Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes/Systems Theoretic
Process Analysis (STAMP/STPA) [59]. On this path, the RAG may
represent a tool to bring safety management into the core business
of the organization to support the development of a healthy and
efficient work environment.
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